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THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE FOR THE 1990s 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
It seems to be an anomaly to worry about the adequacy of the defense industrial base at 
a time when the military budget is declining rapidly. Yet several stubborn facts cannot be 
ignored: the United States continues to live in a dangerous world and a relatively high level of 
defense spending is likely in the years ahead- although down very substantially from recent 
peaks. 
For a variety of reasons, it is appropriate to consider the future capability to design and 
produce high-tech weapon systems. We should try to learn the lessons from the recent past. 
Background 
The pattern of defense spending over the past half century approximated a frantic stop-
and-go (or rather go-and-stop) cycle. Since the beginning of World War II, the military budget 
has never experienced an extended period of stability. Rapid shifts occurred from accelerated 
spending to declining military budgets and back again. The result often has been hasty 
planning of military force structures followed by cancellation or inefficient stretch-outs of 
expensive weapon systems. Given the reduced availability of funds in the years ahead, we 
should try to avoid this waste of resources. 
In voting lower appropriations for defense, the Congress should avoid setting in 
motion a new stop-and-go cycle in military spending. While serious threats to the national 
security are changing in form, they surely continue. Future U.S. military prowess must be 
adequate to deal with a variety of dangerous contingencies. Both Congress and the 
Administration should plan on future levels of defense spending high enough to permit a ready 
transition to a more active military posture should that be required. 
Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at 
Washington University in St. Louis and author of Small Wars, Big Defense (Oxford University 
Press, 1992). This paper was presented to the Conference on Reconstitution, Force Structure, 
and Industrial Strategy at Harvard University, May 8, 1992. 
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From the viewpoint of the defense contractors, a substantial downsizing is the most 
sensible response to the greatly reduced market for military equipment that seems likely in the 
1990s. The sooner the major contractors trim their excess capacity - through restructuring, 
mergers, sales of assets, or closing down unneeded facilities - the stronger will be their 
ability to withstand the competitive rigors of the new military marketplace. The alternative to 
this painful but necessary course of action will be large flows of red ink and rising debt loads, 
which will weaken their capability to survive as viable firms in this unique and important 
sector of the economy. 
Like companies in other industries, individual defense firms have no particular claim to 
maintenance of their present size, or even to their continued existence. Most of these firms 
will find that a more modest level of operations is also a more efficient scale in the decade 
ahead. 
It is heartening to note that most defense industry leaders are declining to support 
proposals for government to "assist" them in converting to civilian markets. They are realistic 
enough to understand that, in the words of one company chief executive, "the best concept for 
conversion is to take the defense industry down slowly." 
The United States requires a viable group of experienced companies and highly skilled 
people to meet current and future defense needs. Moreover the major defense prime 
contractors and subcontractors constitute a key part of this nation's capability for industrial 
innovation. That is no argument for a subsidy to defense companies. It does lead to 
rethinking the traditional Pentagon attitude toward its contractors. 
It is important that there be significant competition among the defense producers that 
remain. The government should not become excessively reliant on any one of them for any 
major category of weaponry. That means not squeezing the contractors too hard in a vain 
attempt to minimize the effects of budget cuts on weapon-system procurement. 
During the 1980s, Congress and the Department of Defense made many changes in 
procurement procedures which reduced the profitability of defense business. These 
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developments have been reflected in the exodus from the military market of tens of thousands 
of subcontractors, even during the period of rapid increases in defense procurement. 
In the 1980s, the existence of a large base of prime contractors competing for a 
relatively few but extremely expensive weapon systems forced all in the group to assume 
greater risks and to bid more aggressively. They were motivated by the need to utilize 
capacity and by the fear of missing key milestone programs and thus being left out of a whole 
generation of technological advancement. 
This process increased the tendency of the contractors to act in effect as bankers, 
helping to finance the military buildup. Coupled with the simultaneous changes in acquisition 
policy and business taxation, all this reduced the profitability of defense work. But so long as 
the defense budget was rising, this arrangement kept a large base of contractors afloat and an 
extensive array of weapon systems in development and production. That approach to defense 
contracting is no longer feasible. 
The quaint notion of producing more weapon systems by paying defense contractors 
less must be classified as a futile exercise in wishful thinking. The only sensible approach is to 
tailor the military's demand to match the limited supply of fiscal cloth. 
In addition, the acquisition process itself must be overhauled so as to reduce the 
needless burdens placed on defense contractors. Cutting the burdensome overhead costs 
imposed by public policy should enable the companies to produce more equipment than a 
restrictive budget policy otherwise would permit. It would also make them more competitive 
in civilian markets. 
Reforming the Military Procurement Process 
The needed reforms of the military procurement process fall into three categories. The 
first is to streamline the rules. The second is to upgrade the caliber of the people involved in 
the process. The third is to change the incentives facing the people who produce the 
equipment. 
c 
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Let us begin with the legal framework. The sad fact is that American business, 
military and civilian, is faced with a major expansion of expensive and burdensome regulatory 
legislation. 
Efficiency can be served by stripping out the host of special contract provisions that 
require military contractors to act more like government bureaus doling out benefits to 
designated classes of beneficiaries than like private enterprises delivering innovation and 
technological progress. 
The effectiveness of military procurement can be improved by removing the myriad of 
restraints and directives imposed by members of Congress anxious to protect the defense jobs 
located in their states or districts. Forcing the military to buy weapon systems they do not 
need is the most inefficient way of providing benefits to constituents. 
A sweeping overhaul of the entire government procurement process is the most 
effective remedy for the continuing proliferation of detail and trivia. Replace the current 
30,000 pages of military procurement regulations with short, simple regs - 100 pages or less. 
That means eliminating all the socioeconomic provisions and the restrictive 
"micromanagement" provisions as well. 
It is ridiculous for Congress to legislate such trivia as setting rank and grade for 
competition advocates or establishing tours of duty for program managers or setting rules for 
allocating overhead to spare parts or repeatedly revising the synopsizing requirements in the 
announcements of requests for proposals. It is hard to keep a straight face when you read the 
GAO response to the New Jersey congressman who was worried about the adequacy of defense 
procurement of fresh fruits and vegetables from the Garden State. Just think of the loss to the 
national security if apples are imported from New York or Washington State. 
Simplifying military procurement is also the most direct way of responding to the small 
firms' perennial complaints that they are scared away from defense work because of the 
complexity of the process. 
s 
Comprehensive reform requires dividing military procurement into two categories: 
items that can be purchased readily from the private sector, and the acquisition of weapon 
systems. The great majority of all procurements, items readily available from the civilian 
sector, should be made in the same manner that civilian agencies do their buying: using 
standard commercial, rather than detailed military, specifications. 
To be sure, there are many borderline cases. Here the advice of a group of military 
policy experts assembled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies is useful. The 
CSIS group recommends a concerted effort to accept commercial specs when they will not 
affect operational requirements. They specifically caution against favoring military specs 
which only marginally improve operational capability or which cover the most extreme 
environments. 
For weapons acquisition, selection should be made on the basis of prototypes produced 
by two or more competing firms. Mounds of paperwork are not an adequate substitute. The 
only consistently reliable means of getting the information needed to evaluate a proposed 
military system is to build prototypes and to test them. Given the repeated shortcomings 
resulting from rushing weapon systems to premature production, we can brush aside the 
counterargument that prototypes are costly and time-consuming to build. 
Virtually everyone who has examined the military procurement process has focused on 
the crucial role of the people who award and administer contracts. The capability of 
procurement officials must be raised. The authority of the manager of each weapon system 
should be increased commensurate with the responsibility of the job. 
Many managers of new weapons programs function as little more than briefing 
specialists and marketing representatives. At least some of the officers assigned to supervise 
weapon production should be experienced in industrial management. They should also possess 
the authority needed to accomplish their jobs, be well compensated, and be accountable for the 
results. It is essential to improve the training of the officers responsible for making multi-
million (often billion) dollar decisions. 
c 
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The cumbersome staffing structure of the military procurement process must also be 
overhauled and streamlined. The number of acquisition personnel should be cut substantially, 
down to the levels of comparable commercial business. The present five or more 
administrative levels of review should also be cut back sharply. Some of these layers have an 
extensive horizontal structure. The views of many diff~rent officers must be accommodated in 
order to pass through a given layer. 
The federal government should take a leaf out of the book of private business. Many 
companies have gone through a painful downsizing in the course of which they have changed 
entrenched institutional cultures, enhancing decisionmaking and stimulating innovation. The 
payoffs in terms of cost and efficiency have been substantial. 
But reforming procurement personnel and procedures, however necessary, is only a 
prelude to doing a better job of designing and producing weapon systems. 
The truly serious problems arise in buying items that are so advanced that they do not 
exist at the time of purchase - new generations of aircraft, missiles, and communication 
equipment. Ideally, the award should go to the company that will provide the optimum 
combination of high quality, low cost, timely delivery, and ready maintainability. However, 
who can really ascertain those qualities ahead of time? The answer is not to award the 
development and production work to contractors who want the business so badly that they will 
underestimate cost substantially or overpromise on performance. 
There is a way out of this dilemma. It is to take more fully into account the bidder's 
past performance on defense contracts. The company's track record is an important indication 
of the quality of its future work. Focusing on actual accomplishment provides a powerful 
incentive for improvement. 
The Future Condition of Defense Contractors 
Although the bottom is not about to fall out of the military market, a tough period of 
belt tightening bas begun. The broad product and market base of many of the companies 
0 
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involved should help the defense industry handle the transition to a smaller military market. 
However, the painfulness of the adjustments ahead will vary. 
The Primary Defense Contractors 
Many of the large aerospace companies - such as General Dynamics, Grumman, 
Lockheed, Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, and Northrop - rely on the Department of 
Defense for most of their income. Some, notably General Dynamics, are widely diversified 
within the military market, producing aircraft, missiles, tanks, and submarines. Others like 
Martin Marietta have gained fairly secure subsystem niches within that market. Still others, 
such as McDonnell Douglas, have diversified to a significant degree into commercial aircraft 
work (but without attaining profitability). Most of these companies should be able to weather 
the storm, though not at their current volumes of sales and employment. 
Companies like Grumman and Northrop, dependent on just a few weapon systems, 
may be in for a difficult time, depending on the future of those specific contracts. They surely 
are more vulnerable than the more diversified defense contractors. They are responding with 
actions which make sense for them but create concerns for the future - such as reducing 
company-funded research and development. 
Because of the military's great dependence on the major defense contractors for 
designing and building key weapon systems, their survival as a group seems assured. 
Nevertheless, a shakeout of their present numbers could well occur. Substantial excess 
capacity coupled with weak finances characterize this key segment of the defense industrial 
base. Mergers and consolidations may reduce the number of current players. Some of the 
fmancially weaker firms may be acquired by civilian-based companies. A smaller group of 
stronger firms will enhance the long-run survivability of this group of companies. 
Major Defense Divisions of Civilian-Oriented Companies 
In contrast, other major defense contractors look primarily to commercial markets for 
the bulk of their sales. Examples of large companies with important defense segments include 
8 
Boeing, Litton, Raytheon, Rockwell, Tenneco, and United Technologies. In most of those 
firms, the defense divisions are separate from the commercial activities. Boeing represents an 
interesting transition since the 1950s, from a firm which was then overwhelmingly dependent 
on defense business. 
In other cases- AT&T, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, Honeywell, and 
Westinghouse- defense work is a minor part of their total sales. However, each is a large 
and important defense contractor. GE is well diversified in the military market, its products 
ranging from nuclear reactors for submarines to missiles to space systems. Yet, cutbacks in 
the purchases of new aircraft will hurt this major supplier of jet engines. 
In some cases, these firms will benefit from the expansion of civilian markets, 
especially if macroeconomic policy succeeds in maintaining high aggregate levels of economic 
activity. Because their contracts with the Pentagon generally are less profitable than their 
commercial sales, some of these companies will respond to shrinking military markets by 
phasing out defense business or trying to sell their defense segments. Emerson, Honeywell, 
and Olin already have. 
Smaller Contractors and Subcontractors 
Less attention is usually given to the very large array of small businesses - some 
prime contractors, and far more subcontractors to the large firms. These smaller companies 
provide the components and parts vital to every weapon system (ranging from fasteners and 
seals to pumps and castings). The reported erosion of the defense industrial base in recent 
years centers on the enterprises in this category. Many of them will be hurt in the defense 
transition, especially as large prime contractors pull business back into the parent company. 
In a survey of 120 of its subcontractors on the M-1 tank, General Dynamics found that 
15 percent of the firms would have to close a plant if production of the tank was ended. On 
the other hand, many of the smaller firms are more capable of dual military-commercial work 
than the larger and often more muscle-bound primes. 
, 
( 
( 
9 
The Need for Reversibility 
A strong industrial base is an essential part of the capability of quickly reversing the 
direction of military policy. As we have seen in the Gulf War, effective reversibility requires 
a basic military force in existence, which can be augmented promptly by calling up the 
reserves and the national guard. But a future period of sustained reductions in defense 
spending underscores two other key aspects of reversibility: a healthy defense manufacturing 
base and an ongoing research and development effort focusing on the design of new and 
improved weapon systems. 
That does not require maintaining every weapon system or military supplier. But 
reversibility does point up the need to maintain an adequate industrial base containing an array 
of strong prime contractors and subcontractors that can compete effectively for the design and 
production of the equipment that is required. 
The notion of reversibility is consistent with closing down or selling off defense plants 
no longer needed. The defense industry is coming off an all-time peak and a substantial 
reduction in its size is to be expected. Since many of its production facilities are ancient by the 
current standards of the competitive commercial economy, the opportunity to phase them out 
should be welcomed. 
It is vital that the remaining defense suppliers in the aggregate be financially viable and 
that they possess the ability to meet the likely design and production needs of the military 
establishment in the years ahead. That is the basic challenge of maintaining an industrial base 
adequate to respond to the changing threats to the national security. 
